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Agricultural Research: Benefits and
Beneficiaries ofAlternative Funding Mechanisms
by Wallace £. Huflman and Richard E. Just'
\2I29I91
TheU.S. has developed a very successful R&D systemfor agriculture. It is a system
having shared financing and performance. Thefederal government provides about 24 percent of
all agricultural research funds, while state governments provide 16percent and the private sector
60 percent. In contrast, federal agencies actually perform about 15percentof the research,
compared to 31 percentbeingcarried out bystate agencies and54 percentbyprivate businesses
(Figure 1). Thus, the federal government andprivatesector transfer funds to state institutions for
performing agricultural research.
Public expenditures onR&D arejustified bythe existences of large social (collective)
benefits relative to private (one individual or company) benefits. The USDA, with itsAgricultural
Research Service (ARS) and Economic Research Service (ERS), performs most federal
government's in-house agricultural research and the State Agricultural Experiment Stations
(SAES)-vet med schools conduct most state agricultural research. The in-house USDAresearch
is all federally funded, and itsjustification hinges onconducting research thatbenefits thenation
and requires specialized resources. The SAES-vet med schools have federal, state, and private
funding for research, and their justification hinges on conducting research that primarily benefits
clientele residing intheir respective states and secondarily benefits other states and thenation.
The authors are professors ofeconomics, Iowa State University, and agricultural and
resource economics, University ofMa^land, respectively.
2Since 1980, the growth in agricultural research funds (in constant prices) has been largely
in the private sector (about 3% per year), and a very slight increase in state and federal funds for
agricultural research. With the 1996agreement betweenCongressand the President to balance
the Federal budget by 2002, federal agriculturalresearch and other expenditures are getting close
scrutiny. As the Federal Government shiftsgreater responsibility to the States for carryingout
programs, many state governments are also scrutinizing expenditures. State agricultural research
administrators are carefully weighing options and opportunities. The paper presents an analysis of
alternative organization, management, incentive, and funding mechanisms for agricultural research
under budget constraints, including some emphasis on the kinds ofbenefits that are generated and
the groups that reap them. This paper builds on our earlier research, Huffman and Evenson
(1993) and Huffinan and Just (1994, 1995), and other research, including Fuglie et al. 1996.
Successful R&D and Economic Growth
The potential nonrival or pure publicgood nature ofknowledge and information is
currently accepted to be a key attribute of the economics ofresearch (R&D), technological
change, and productivity growth. The empirical evidence, however, shows much ofresearch to
be an impure public good or nonrival but partiallyexcludable, i.e., public or private research
performed by one institution or agency spills overpartially but not completely to other institutions
or agencies. The extentof research spillovers, or positive externalities, is conditioned by the
public or privatesourceof the innovation andbythe geographical, technical, geoclimatic, and
cultural distance between producing institutions and potential userinstitutions. Seefor example
Hufl&nan and Evenson 1993, Byerlee and Traxler 1996, Evenson and Kislev 1975, Gollin and
3Evenson 1996, Adams and Jaffe 1996, and Henderson and Cockbum 1996. For firms/producers
to be assured ofreceiving benefits ofR&D, some R&D activity must be undertaken in their area
to produce local or impure public goods. This might not require more than low-power research
ofa screening and adaptive type.
Research institutions diflFer in their productivity by size and scope ofactivities undertaken.
Sizeable research institutions are more productive than small ones because ofeconomies of scope
across their research programs arising fi'om a diverse set of projects that can better capture
internal and external knowledge spillovers and economies of scale arising from specialization of
effort and sharing offixed costs. See Henderson and Cockbum 1996 and Byerlee and Traxler
1996. Individual research programs within an institution, however, exhaust scale economies after
a few scientists are employed. In contrast, huge research institutions face efficiency losses due to
coordination problems, absence ofexternal competition, and possible loss oftouch with clientele
needs.
An economicallyefficientorganizationofresearch requires (some) redundance ofeffort,
diversity ofincentive schemes, and possible restrains on the mteractions ofresearchers who are
attempting to achieve the same innovation, advance in knowledge, or newproduct/process. In
R&D, the "payofiE" ismost accurately described as the bestof agents' outputs (andnot the total
combined outputof agents). Although there is only one bestoutput or innovation at a point
in time, social welfare and principals (e.g., research administrators) will be better off over the
long run ifmultiple agents (researchers) are assigned thegeneral taskof achieving a particular
innovation. The reasons include an"insurance effect" of relative performance evaluation anda
"sampling effect" because ofuncertainty about each researchers output. The value ofmultiple
4researchers or agents is generally increasing in both the variability ofoutputs across researchers/
agents and the value ofa success relative to the wage bill paid to rese^chers/agents (Levitt 1995).
The sampling effect becomes more valuable when researchers' activities are not highly correlated,
and are largest when they are independ^t. Also, see Evenson (1994) and Evenson ^d Kislev
(1975) for an application ofindependent innovation searches as a model for improving crop
varieties.
The amount of socially productive activity leading to real income and welfare in a free
society is determined primarilyby the relative returns to socially productive versus socially
unproductive activities. When people are free to do so, they choose occupations that offer the
highest returns on their abilities and time (seeMurphy, Shleifer, and Vishney 1991), andwhen an
occupation encompasses multiple tasks, they allocate their time based on relative returns, given
their abilities (Singell, Lillydahl, and Singell 1996).
A critical issue is whether a country's most talented individuals choose to allocate their
time to socially productive or unproductive activities (Murphy, Shleifer, andVishney 1991). If
themost talented individuals choose public orprivate R&D or private sector entrepreneurship
astheiroccupation, theyinnovate and organize production to foster economic growth.
Alternatively, if theychoose anoccupation of rent seeking, they are socially unproductive, i.e.,
they engage in redistributive activities butdo notadd to real output of the society. One could
view rent seeking here as a taxonthe profits ofthe private sector or onthe public resources
available for innovation. There isboth "official" rent seeking, e.g., lobbying for special private
interests, and "unofficial" rent-seeking through bribery, theft, favoritism, and litigation. Less
talented individuals work for the more talented ones in productive or rent-seeking activities.
5When a society provides large opportunities and rewards to rent seeking relative to R&D
and entrepreneurial activities, it causes several things to happen. First, total output and per capital
real income ofthe society is reduced. Second, the best (and average) talent of individuals
engaged in innovation and production is reduced which may reduce the long-run growth rate.
Third, the best (and average) talent ofrent seekers rises which increase the effectiveness ofrent
seeking which is socially unproductive.
Sturznegger and Tommasi (1994) present an economicmodel showing the potential
negative effects ofallocating scientists' time away from innovation and toward rent-seeking
activities when the distribution of research ilinds has a political component. They make the share
of scientists' time that is allocated to innovationa choice (with the alternative ofpursuing a fixed
total quantity ofpublic research funds by rent-seeking or redistributional activities). Given that
publicR&D funds can be allocated by any arbitraryformula that does not consume time of
scientists, a rent-seekingallocation mechanism iswasteful. In addition, competitive-grant
allocation schemes for researchwith highly uncertain outcomestend to become subjective and
not to exploit optimaldiversity ofapproaches. Themajoropposing views are that competition
is needed to select the best projects and lobbying may increase the total quantity of available
research funds.
Funding Mechanisms: Types and Impacts
The primarymechanism for fiinding/financing U.S. agricultural research are marketable
intellectual property rights (IPRS), collection of taxes and allocation of part of the tax revenues to
public research institutions/researchers, and contributions by private industry and commodity
6groups to publicresearch institutions/researchers. Thebenefits and beneficiaries ofthese funding
mechanisms differ.^
IPRs and Private R&D
Federal laws provide the mechanism for definition, enforcement, and transfer ofIPRs.
IPRsinclude patents, plant breeders' rights, seed and breed certificates, copyrights, trademarks,
and trade secrets. For U.S. agricultural inventions, patents, plant breeders rights, and trade
secrets have beenespecially important for investments inR&D bythe private sector. Lets focus
onpatents which are applicable to embodied inventions. Aholder of a U.S. patent isgiven the
right to exclude others from theunauthorized use, sale, ormanufacture oftheproduct, process,
orbiological material. The right to exclude is limited to 20years (from the time ofapplication).
Thepatent application must disclose or remove from secrecy the essential features of the
invention so as to "enable" others to make or use the invention. Disclosure has two main
purposes. In return forgranting amonopoly ownership position to theinventor for20years,
society establishes strong incentives for private sectorR&D and the natureof the invention is
revealed which facilitates knowledge exchanges (Huffman and Evenson 1993, ch. 5). The U.S.
patent law exempts abstract or non-embodied ideas and concept from protection, so it is not
useful for protecting/stimulating innovation in pretechnology and general sciences.
Thus with a patent anindividual or company can use or license theuseof an invention
that is embodied in aproduct, process, orbiological material (for 20 years). This gives the
inventor aright to an income stream associated with the invention. The actual or implicit royalties
are then part ofthe cost ofthe new product, process, or biological material using the invention.
7Hence, demanders/purchasers ofthese new products, processes, and biologicalmaterialsbear
much ofthe cost and obt^ a major part of the benefitsofR&D protected by patents that are
ownedby the private sector. For example, Frey (1996) reports that the U.S. private agronomic
and horticultural seed industry invested 81 percent ofits 1994R&D expenditures to development
ofvarieties with anticipation ofcommercial sale.
Even with a strong legal system, patent owners share the benefits oftheir inventions.
First, the final product, process or biological material embodiedwith the innovation must compete
in the market with other products/processes materials. This means that there must be a perceived
economic benefit of changing fi'om old to new. Second, the pricing ofthe IPRmust be such that
a significant economic incentive exists for broad adoption of the innovation because this is the
onlyway that large scale sales ofa innovation can be obtained. Third, the process ofobtaining an
IPR results in revealing new information or knowledge which is available to other innovators in
their work. Fourth, IPR has a limitedlife. Hence, purchasers/demanders ofthe products,
processes, or biological material embodied with the innovation and other inventors share part of
the economic benefits of a patent. Optimal patent enforcement and licensing does not stop all
spillover effects.
Marketable patents cannot be used to directlyreward innovations in the general and
pretechnology sciencefield. Also, they are not a socially effective reward for innovations that
cannot be embodied in products where markets do not exist, e.g., attributes ofenvironmental
quality.
Invention exhausts potential for new discoveries Unless advances in other areas of science
are restoring or addmg to the potential. It isgenerally accepted that research in thegeneral and
8pretechnology sciences provide the advances in knowledge that enhances or restores the potential
for applied research and invention (HufiBnan and Evenson 1993). Because any private sector
enterprise can expect to capture only a small share ofthe benefits from innovations in the general
and pretechnology sciences, they will greatly underinvest from a social perspective in conducting
or voluntarily contributing to the funding of this type research. The free rider problem grows
rapidly as potential commercial beneficiaries increases (Olson; Comes and Sandier).
Public Agricultural Research
In the public sector, conducting research on agriculture is primarily an activity ofU.S.
Department ofAgriculture and the state agricultural experiment stations (including colleges of
veterinarymedicine). See Hufl&nan and Evenson (1993) for history leading to the establishment
of these institutions with major agricultural research missions. A large share ofthis research is
financed from states and federal tax collections. Taxesare a type of involuntary contribution.
USDA. Withinthe USDA, a very large shareof researchis conducted by the Agricultural
ResearchService(ARS) and the Economics Research Services (ERS). SeeHuffinan and
Evenson (1993, pp 30-39) for a discussionofthe long-tenn evolution ofthe structure of research
organized in the USDA. The fiinds for in-house research of the USDA are line items in the
federal government's budget request and appropriation. The administrator ofthe USDAmust
define and discuss their budget before Congress. After hearings onthebudget and reconciliation
ofdifferences between theHouse and Senate, Congress must eventually pass a budget and the
Presidentofthe United Statesmust signit.
9The strongestjustificationfor funding the USDA's own researchoperation is for
conducting research that benefits the nation andrequires specialized resources. By specialized
resources, I mean use ofa large germplasmcollection, a large investment in expensive research
animals, or possibly use of large scale biological, environmental, or economic models. Having
national benefits means that the research has positive spillover benefits to agricultural research
conducted byall (or almost all) state institutions (e.g., SAES and VetMed Schools), or broadly
to private R&D for agriculture, or it provides useful information for national policy decision
making for agriculture. What are indicators ofmeeting thismission? Is the USDA's in-house
researchrelatively important to publicpolicy decisions on the environment and natural resource
issues, food safety and nutrition, community policy, and rural development? Is theUSDA's
in-house research relatively intense inbasic and pretechnology science advances relative to the
SAES? I do not have the evidence for the first indicator, but some evidence on the secondis
avmlable.
Frey (1996) presents evidence on the relative allocation ofresources to agronomic and
horticultural plant improvement by theUSDA-ARS andSAES for 1994. He uses three
investment categories which are roughly equivalent to pre-technology (plant breeding research),
applied (germplasm enhancement), and developmental (cultivar development) research. The
USDA-ARS allocates 40% ofits research tothe first category versus 30% for the SAES, and
the USDA-ARS allocates 12% to the last category versus 41% for the SAES (see Frey 1996,
Table 4). Clearly the USDA-ARS is much less intensely investing in cultivar development, which
is largely producing local public and private goods. We, however, would also like some direct
evidence on intensive use ofinnovations, e.g., citation patterns ofpatents and publications of
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USDA scientists versus agricultural scientists in state research institutions. More hard evidence
on the benefits and beneficiary ofUSDA in-house research relative to its cost is needed before
major changes in the scale ofUSDA in-house research are made, e.g., before the in-house
research resources are allocated to other federal research programs.
The USDA has expanded its research efforts to some extent through jomt ventures. These
include the use ofcooperative agreements,which are jointly iiinded and performed research
between USDA and SAES-vet med schools, and cooperative research and development
agreements (CRADAs). A CRADA is a research agreement between a federal research unit
and a private company(or other nonfederal institution) involved in the development and
commercialization of specific technology. The principal objective ofCRADAs is to linkpre-
technology research capacityoffederal laboratories with commercial research and development
expertise ofthe private sector. The agreement describes the responsibilities and contributions of
eachpartnerand assigns rights to intellectual property. Fuglie et al. (1996) reports that the
USDA has entered into more than500 CRADAs with private firms aftertheywerefirst
authorized by Congress in 1986. Joint public-private ventures tend to raise issues ofundue
conflicts over sharing of or access to knowledge, which I will returnto later.
SAES and VetMed Schools. The state agricultural experiment stations (and vetmed
schools) receive funds fi"om federal, state, and private sources. For our discussion of benefits and
beneficiaries, it isusefiil to disaggregate asfollows: (1) regular federal sources (CSREES/CSRS-
administered), (2) contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements with theUSDA and contracts
and grants with non-USDA federal agencies; (3) state government appropriations, (4) private
sources (commodity groups, private industry, and private foundations), and (5) other sources.
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The cost of (1) and (2) is borne by federal taxpayers and of (3) is borne by payers of state taxes.
The cost of (4) is borne by private groups. Over the period 1960 to 1995, the notable trends for
SAES revenue are a steady decline in the share of regular f^eral funds through 1990, a rise in the
share ofother federal government research funds, a rise in the share offunds from private
sources, and a decline between 1990 and 1995 in the share due to state government
appropriations (see Table 1). State government appropriates continue to account for about
50 percent of SAES funds.
A debate continues on the advantages and disadvantagesofregular federal funds, for
example formulafunds, public competitive grant funding, public ear-markedfunds, and private
contract funds for SABS research. A major part of regular federal funds are formula funds.
Formula fimding ofstate agricultural research,where states share federal funds based on a
legislated rule, originated in the politics needed to pass the original (1887) and tended Hatch
Act (1955) legislation. However, to obtainformula funds, states must at least match the federal
formula fiinds with other research fiinds. Thus, if a stateaccepts federal formula fimds for SAES
research it agrees to spend at least twice the formula amount on agricultural research. This has
been a strong inducement for states to help support agricultural research. The research agenda is
set by SAES directors whose primary clientele reside in their respective states. With formula
fimding, the federal government has no real input into the choices ofresearch projects undertaken
by SAES scientists.^
Several advantages ofa fonnula-distribution ofresearch fiinds are: no opportunity or
reward to interstate rent-seeking activity to affect the distribution, an implied guarantee of
relatively stable or predictable federal support(subsidy) to states for their SAES, and low
12
administrative cost of the programwhich falls largelyon administrators and not scientists. A
disadvantage is that the marginal (social) benefit fi'om federal funding for SAES research is
unlikely to be equal across states. Also, the choiceofprojects to be undertaken is also under state
control (e.g., by the SAES director and scientists) and not national control. The requirement of
25% ofthe Amended Hatch fiinds be allocated to regional research, however, is a legislative
mechanism to encourage SAES directors to include research possessing significant interstate
spillovers into their portfolio ofprojects, or to see benefits beyond their own state boundaries.
The USDA*s competitive grant program (CGP) was started in 1977 to address high-
priority research areas identified by an advisory committee to the Secretary ofAgriculture. In
the mid-1980s it took a biotechnology focus, and since 1990, it has been focused on basic science
for agriculture—the National Research Initiative. The size ofthe USDA's Competitive Grants
Program expanded significantly during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
With the USDA's CGP, the research agenda is set at the national level, and scientists
across a broad range of institutions compete for the fiinds.^ Proposals are prepared by scientists;
they are reviewedby a small set offield specialists, and then a panel ofscientists rank the
proposals. The highest rated proposalsby the panel are awarded researchfijnds.
The goal of the CGP is to produce innovations that havebroad usefiilness to agriculture
(i.e., a national as opposed to a local public good). However, theprogram hassome undesirable
effects. Significant research sources are invested in proposal preparation and evaluation, and
these come fi'om other resources, for example, "uncommitted" federal formulaor state
government research funds. Additional transactions costsare imposed whengrant awards do
not cover the resource cost ofcompleting a "funded"project. Some state directors and research
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administrators favor and others disapprove of the direction set by federal competitive funds and
the leveraging which these flinds often require. In addition, CGP is open to potential rent seeking
beha\dor by scientists and state research administrators, and "peer panels" tend to impose too
much homogeneity ofapproaches or to require too much preliminary research evidence. A
socially good national research flindingmechanismfor research in basic and pretechnology
science should not unload the riskinessof scientific discoveryon other institutions or funding
mechanisms.
State government appropriations ^e the single largest component offunds for the SAES
system as a whole and for most states. The decision-making and administrative process for
bringing an experiment station's budget before its state legislature differs across states (see
Huffinan and Evenson 1993, pp. 221-22). The economic reason that state governments fund
SAES research is to produce local public benefits that can onlybe obtained from a locally on
going agricultural research institution, i.e., there are Iowa-specific agricultural research benefits
made possible byhaving an on-going institution likethe Iowaagricultural experiment station. In
particular, Iowa clientele cannot expect to obtainthe samebenefits from research conducted in
Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, Missouri, Wisconsin or SouthDakota. Also, many of the Iowa
producers areindirect competition with producers inother states (and countries).
The private sector allocates about 10percent of its agricultural R&Dfunds to SAES-
vetmed school research. These come as research contracts or grants largely for innovations to
benefit a private firm ora particular commodity group (i.e., private goods) and not for general
social usefulness (public goods). Open sharing ofR&D results is seldom inthe private sector's
interest, and it is generally in the best interest ofprivate firms to seek exclusive rights to
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innovations from projects that they fund in public researchinstitutions. With private sector
fundingofSAES-vet med school research, private sector interests may also redirect public
resources (e.g., uncommitted state and formula&nds and use ofservices ofpublicly paid for fixed
capital in research equipment, facilities, plots, and herds) to the pursuit of private interests and
greatly change the composition ofinnovationsproduced. These issues are emphasizedby
Hufifinan and Just (1995) and Lyons, Rausser, and Simon (1996). The long term outcome could
be a reduction in the willingness of state and federal tax payers to fund public agricultural
research.
Some Empirical Evidence
Although there are a number of theories about effects offunding mechanisms for public
agricultural research, the empirical evidence remains thin. We, however, have been working to
quantify and test some ofthese ideas.
We exammed the possible effects ofchanging the fundingmechanism for SAES research
on its economic impacts/benefits. We (Hufi&nan andJust 1994) tested andrejected the hypothesis
thatgrant, contract, and cooperative agreement funded public agricultural research are equally
productive as federal formula and statefimded public agricultural research formcreasing state
agricultural productivity. Our resuhs did not provide anyevidence that public or private grant,
contract, or cooperative research was more productive than federal formula or state fianded
research. In particular, increasmg the share offederal formula and state funded research increases
state agricultural productivity.
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To obtain further evidence on the size of transactions costs and the distribution ofbenefits
from research, we participated in a survey ofLand-Grant agricultural (SAES) scientists. With
these data, we have quantified the size of transactions costs ofresearch relative to total SAES
scientists timeallocated to research. In 1995, when about30 percent of SAES fijnds were
obtained from grants and contracts, 28 percent of scientists time was allocated to proposal
preparation, proposal evaluation, and communicating withfunding agencies an attempting to
affect the interest offunding institutions (see Table 2). This left 78 percent of scientist time for
actually doing the research. Hence, wejudge transactions costs to be a significant issue in
evaluating funding mechanisms.
Scientists in the survey wereasked to give theirperceiveddistribution ofbenefits from
projects fiinded by state government, federal government, and private industry. Forstate
government funded research, 63 percent of the benefits were perceived asgoing to clientele in
their state, 28 percent to people and groups in other states, and 9percent to others (see Table 3).
For federal government funded research, the distribution as 44 percent to clientele in their state,
40 percent topeople and groups in other states, and 16 percent toothers. For private industry
funding, the distribution was 30 percent to people in their own state, 55 percent to the company
providing the funds, and 15 percent to others. Hence, a strong contrast in the distribution of
perceived benefits ofSAES research by scientists across major funding sources exists, and a
relatively large share ofperceived benefits ofstate government funded research goes to local
clientele and ofprivate industry fiinding research goes to the company providing the funding.
These results provide additional evidence that shifting the distribution ofSAES funding more
heavily to private industry will significantly change the distribution ofbenefits ofSAES research.
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The motivation of scientists is also important to understanding the consequences of
alternative organization ofSAES research. Using the survey ofLand-Grant scientists, we tested
the hypothesis that SAES scientistsperceive the rewards to (1) contract and grant research and
(2) other research (including federal formula and state government funded) to be the same (see
Table 4). The types ofrewards that were examinedwere (1) recognition ofadministrators,
(2) professional reputation, (3) personal satisfaction, and (4) increasingyour own resources. For
both types of research, the reward with the highest ratingwas "personal satisfaction" and the
reward with the second highest rating was "professional reputation." A test of the null hypothesis
that the perceivedrewards had the samerating couldnot be rejected at the 5 percent significance
level for the first three typesof reward. However,, for "increasing your resources," the hypothesis
of equality ofratingwas rejected. The reward of "increasing your own resources" received a
higherratingfor contract and grant researchth^ for other SAES research. Hence, some
differences inperceived rewards bySAES scientists exist for contract andgrantfunded research
and for other research support.
Our results and discussion suggest that the reward structure ofSAES scientists is not
simple, and recent empirical research by Singell, Lillydahl, and Singell (1996) support our
conclusion. They examined the allocation (shares) offaculty working time to teaching, research,
and service fora random sample of 8,000 faculty in480 U.S. four-year colleges and universities
in 1987. The types ofinstitutions ranged from premier public and private universities to small
private colleges. Themain conclusions of their paper arethat the incentive structure of a
university and normal life-stage/cycle position ofthe feculty play major roles inthe time allocation
offaculty. Furthermore, the attributes ofafaculty tend, not too surprisingly, to reinforce the
17
primary"mission" ofthe university at the time that they were hired, i.e., universities tend to select
for particular attributes whentheyMre faculty andtheseattributes are on average in agreement
withthe institutional mission. An important implication is that the mission of a university in the
pastsignificantly conditions the response thata university canexpect from its faculty to new
incentives and a new mission in the future.
Conclusion
We haveexamined someof the alternative systems for funding and conducting agriculture
researchand their impactson resourceuse, benefits, and beneficiaries. TheU.S. environment is
one of amarket economy, gradual strengthening ofintellectual property rights to innovations, and
a possibly shrinking roleof the federal government in funding agricultural research.
Some implications forpolicy. The private sector should bepermitted to canyoutresearch
that itwants towith minimal direct competition from the public research institutions. The public
research institution should focus on producing advances in general and pretechnology science that
ultimately may becomplementary to private R&D activities and conduct applied research inareas
where the irmovations are socially beneficial but no private market exists, e.g., minor crops, food
safety, environmental quality. The sharing ofthe public agricultural research mission between
the USDA and state institutions needs re-examining for balance. State agricultural research
institutions have a fairly diverse source offunding types, but state taxpayers continue to account
for 50 percent ofthe agricultural research resources. The source offiindmg and/or the type of
fiinding mechamsm does affect the types ofbenefits^mpacts ofagricultural research conducted by




1. See Wright (1983) for general discussion ofinvention incentives and Alston, Norton, and
Pardey (1995) for a review ofmethods for evaluating impacts ofagricultural research.
2. For example, in the 1887 Hatch Act, each qualifyingstate was to receive annually $15,000
to help support a state agricultural experiment station. In the AmendedHatch Act (1955),
several pieces offederal legislation dealing in funding state agricultural experiment
stations, including the original Hatch Act, were consolidated. A new formula or allocation
rule was established: 20% ofeach year's federal SAES appropriate is divided equally
among states, 26% is allocated according to a state's share ofthe farm population, 26%
is allocated on a state's share of the national rural population, and 3% is allocated to
administrativecost. The legislation also required that 25% ofthe appropriation be
allocated to regional research.
3. In 1995, 69.6% ofthe USDA-Competitive Grant Awards were to scientists in land-grant
universities and half of this total was to SAES scientists.
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Regular federal funds 21.6 17.0 14.0 15.1
Other federal government
research funds 7.6 11.4 12.1 15.1
State government appropriations 58.2 55.5 55.0 50.5
Private industry, commodity
groups and private foundations' 7.0 9.2 13.2 14.0
Other 5.6 6.9 5.7 5.3
Total all sources 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
^ This is theamount received from industry and "other nonfedoral** sources, excluding state appropriations
and product sales.
Source: USDA, CSRS and CSREES, Current Research Information System, Inventory ofAgricultural
Research, various years.
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Table 2. Allocation ofresearch time by SAES scientists, 1995.
Uses oftime Share of time (%)
Propo^ preparation 13.4
Proposal evaluation 5.5
Attempting to affect the interests of
iUnding institutions 2.6
Communicating with funding agencies 6.5
Doing research 72.0
Total 100.0 N = 581
Source:**ModemAgricultural Sciencein Transition: A Surv^ ofLand-GrantAgricultural Scientists,^
University ofWisconsin, 1995.
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Table 3 . Perceived distribution (%) ofbenefits by SAES scientists from their research funds





Clientele iii your People and Company
state or people groups in providing















^ Each respondent was asked "Toryour research frmds by (source), what would beyour assessment
ofthe distribution ofresearch benefits from these projects across the followinggroups?" The federal
governmentsource reference includedHatch,USDACooperativeAgreements,and other federal grants
and contracts. The private industry sourcereference included commodi^ groups, corporations, etc.
Source: "ModemAgricultural Science in Transition: A SuiTtyof Land-Grant Agricultural Scientists,"
UnivCTsity ofWisconsin, 1995.
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Table 4. Perception ofrewards to SAES scientists from (i) contract and grant research








Recognition ofadministrators 3.15 2.94 not rejected
Professional reputation 4.03 4.00 not rejected
Personal satisfaction 4.42 4.41 not rejected
Increasing your resources 3.80 3.26 rejected
* Scientists were asked torate the importance ofeach reward type on ascale of1to5,with a 1being
"not important or not needed" and a 5 being "veiy important or essential."






























Includes research byAgricultural Research Service,
Forest Service, Economic Research Service, and National
Agricultural Library.
2SAES's are State agricultural experiment stations; coop,
inst. include the 1890 schools, forestry schools, and
veterinary schools.
Sources: Economic Research Service. Data for Federal
and State research expenditures derived frorri USDA,
Inventory ofCurrent Research-, data for private sector/
Industry research expenditures estimated from Klotz, Fuglie,
and Pray (1995).
